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1. Introduction
Fiscal decentralization, the allocation of tax and spending powers to lower levels of gov-
ernment, is now an established policy objective, in many developed and developing coun-
tries. Moreover, it is actively promoted as a development strategy by organizations such
as the World Bank (Azfar et al., 2001, World Bank, 2000). The usual advantages that are
claimed for decentralization that one can nd in the literature include the following (Azfar
et al., 2001, Lockwood, 2005, Oates, 1999). First, decentralization is claimed to improve
allocative e¢ ciency, in the sense that the goods provided by governments in localities will
be better matched to the preferences of the residents of those localities. This is some-
times known as the preference-matching argument. Second, decentralization is argued to
increase the e¢ ciency of delivery of government services. In this literature, production
e¢ ciency is interpreted in a wide sense, to accommodate ine¢ ciencies like corruption,
waste, and poor governance. There is now quite a large literature on decentralization
and allocative e¢ ciency1. By contrast, the literature on decentralization and productive
ine¢ ciency is small.
The theoretical literature identies three mechanisms by which decentralization may
lead to increased e¢ ciency2. The rst is that decentralization may give voters increased
electoral control over incumbents. For example, in Seabright (1996) and Persson and
Tabellini (2000, Chapter 9), decentralization is shown, under some conditions, to reduce
the incentives for incumbents to divert rents from tax revenue, because under decentral-
ization, the (negative) link between such rent diversion and the probability or re-election
is stronger. Hindriks and Lockwood (2005) extend this argument to show how decentral-
ization may increase the equilibrium probability that corrupt incumbents are voted out
of o¢ ce (a stronger selection e¤ect in the terminology of Besley and Smart, 2004).
The second mechanism is that decentralization enables yardstick competition be-
tween sub-national governments: voters can use the performance of neighbouring gov-
ernments (or governments of regions that are otherwise similar to their own) to make
inferences about the competence or benevolence of thier own local politicians (Besley and
1See for example, Alesina and Spolare(1997), Besley and Coate (2003), Bolton and Roland (1997),
Ellingsen (1998), Gilbert and Picard (1996), Lockwood (2002), Oates (1972), Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf
(2002), Wallis and Oates(1988).
2Note that along with all of the related literature, we estimate a reduced form relationship between
scal decentralization and productive e¢ ciency. In our data set, we have no way of distinguishing between
the lobbying channel, and the political agency channel. In particular, data on any dimension of lobbying
activity in any country, including Switzerland, is very hard to nd, and does not exist at the cantonal
level.
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Smart(2004), Bordignon, Cerniglia, and Revelli (2004))
The third mechanism is that decentralization may lead to a decrease in lobbying by
interest groups, which both distorts policy choice and increases waste of public funds.
Here, a small number of contributions by Bardhan and Mookherjee (2003), Bordignon,
Colombo, and Galmarini (2003), and Redoano (2003) emphasize that the link between
decentralization and lobbying is ambiguous. Indeed, under some conditions, there can
be more lobbying and distortion of policy choice under decentralization, conrming the
belief, going back to the US Federalist Papers in the 18th century, that local government
is more susceptible to captureby lobbies.
The existing empirical literature does not try to precisely identify these mechanisms.
Rather, the approach is to look at a reduced-form relationship between scal decentral-
ization and some indicator of the e¢ ciency of government. This literature is, to our
knowledge, principally based on cross-country data. The level of scal decentralization is
usually3 measured by the percentage of government expenditures made, or taxes collected,
at sub-national level, as recorded by the IMFs Government Financial Statistics. These
papers then run regressions where the dependent variable is some easily measured and
internationally comparable outcome of government activity against the preferred decen-
tralization measure together with a set of controls. For example, in Khaleghian, 2003,
the outcome is immunization coverage rate in the population Treisman, 2002, used im-
munization coverage also, along with basic drug availability, youth illiteracy rates, and
the number of kilometers of paved road per resident of the country. Alternatively, some
papers use as the dependent variable some more general indicator of government e¤ective-
ness (Huther and Shah, 1998), or corruption (Mello and Barenstein, 2001, Fisman and
Gatti, 2000).
In our view, there are two main problems with this literature. First, many of these
papers rely on the IMF measure of scal decentralization which - it is widely recognized -
does not measure very accurately the true autonomy of sub-central government to choose
expenditures and set taxes4. Second, these regressions do not estimate government pro-
3Triesman (2002) is an exception here: he uses several di¤erent constitutional indicators of decen-
tralization, such as a dummy variable for a federal country, the number of di¤erent tiers of government,
etc.
4For a critique of the IMFs Government Finance Statistics. the use of these statistics as measures
of the true autonomy of local governments, see Ebel and Yimaz(2002). These statistics tend to over-
estimate the share of government expenditure and tax revenues that are under the control of sub-national
government, and they do so in a way that varies widely across countries. For example, consider a country
(e.g. Germany) where some taxes are set nationally but where the revenues are shared with sub-national
governments via a xed formula. The share of tax revenue going to sub-national government is measured
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duction functions, because they do not control for the inputs to the output that is the
dependent variable. For example, several papers that study health outputs do not con-
trol for health expenditures, number of doctors, etc. In the absence of controls for these
inputs, these regressions can not tell us much about the e¢ ciency of government as any
observed correlation between decentralization and government output can be attributed
to omitted variable bias.5
To confront these criticisms, our paper uses data on scal decentralization and ed-
ucational inputs and outputs from Swiss cantons over the period 1982-2000. There are
several advantages of these data. First, there are data on the level of scal decentraliza-
tion of spending on education within each Canton, collected on a consistent basis over
Cantons and years. So, this indicator is likely to be a much better indicator of true scal
autonomy than in the cross-country case. Moreover, the spending relates to education
only, and so there is no danger of the kind of aggregation bias that arises when using the
decentralization of total expenditure as an indicator, as do the studies cited above. Our
paper also relies on specic features of the Swiss context that allow us to treat the varia-
tion in decentralization to be exogenous with respect to educational attainment, discussed
further in Section 2.4 below.
As an additional check on this, we study the relationship across Cantons between the
spending measure of decentralization and various direct measures of sub-cantonal auton-
omy in educational policy, specically, which level of government has the authority to
appoint teachers and/or determine their pay level, whether the local government has the
power to set incentive pay, and whether they have some powers over the organization
of the school or curriculum. There is a strong positive correlation between the expendi-
ture measure and an index of these direct measures. Second, in contrast to the existing
literature, as well as measuring output,we can control for the inuence of inputs on
educational outputs, such as educational expenditure per pupil and class size. In our
sample the education output in a given year is the fraction of the 19 year old population
that obtains the Maturité certicate that allows continuation to university.6
in the IMFs statistics as sub-national revenue, even though the lower level of government may have little
or no control over choice of the rate or the base. Similar problems appear on the expenditure size from
spending that is mandated by central government but implemented by lower-level governments.
5For example, if it is found that decentralization is positively related to immunization rates (as does
Khaleghian, 2003), this could simply reect the fact that decentralized countries spend more on immu-
nization, not that they can deliver this service with greater e¢ ciency.
6This measure is a natural choice for Switzerland as standardized test scores are not available. Other
papers (Jacob and Lefgren, 2005), employs measures of educational attainment combined with subjective
teacher performance evaluations. Using US data they show that higher poverty schools strongly value
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Our main nding is that there is a robust positive relationship between scal decen-
tralization and productive e¢ ciency of public good provision in the case of education.
This is present even when canton and year e¤ects and further control variables are al-
lowed for. Finally we nd no empirical support that the gains were accompanied by losses
in terms of other measures of educational attainment. However, we should note that
because the education production function is being estimated at the level of the can-
ton, rather than the individual school, our nding might be interpreted as partly due to
better preference-matching with scal decentralization. For example, more decentralized
cantons may be better able to direct resources towards schools where they know there is
a stronger demand for education up to maturité level.
We also take our investigation further by asking whether other - possibly time-
invariant - features of cantonal and local government interact with decentralization of
education to a¤ect the Maturité pass rate. We nd that a ve-year moving average of
both cantonal and local budgetary surplus (which we take to measure good governance,
following Galiani. and Schargrodsky, 2002) tends to have a positive interaction e¤ect on
the pass rate. So, a given amount of decentralization will lead to greater e¢ ciency gains
if the local government is more competent.
We also nd, that the number of local jurisdictions in a canton (which we take to
measure possible economies of scale) has a negative interaction e¤ect on decentralization.
This is consistent with theoretical predictions, centralizing expenditure on education will
have greater e¢ ciency gains - or rather, smaller losses - when the scope for economies
of scale is larger.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 describes the context of decen-
tralization in Switzerland and why the variation in decentralization can arguably taken
to be exogenous. Section 3 assesses the extent of local autonomy across cantons and its
relationship to expenditure decentralization. Section 4 then turns to the empirical evi-
dence of expenditure decentralization and educational attainment. Section 5 concludes
and discusses the results.
student achievement and are essentially indi¤erent to the principals report of a teachers ability to
promote student satisfaction.
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2. Education Decentralization in Switzerland
2.1. Some Background
Switzerland is a Confederation of 26 cantons. These cantons are independent from the
federal government in terms of school-level education and most aspects of the day-to-
day life in which the state is involved. These 26 Cantons are further divided into 2896
local counties. Table 1 gives for each canton the number of local counties, the average
population size per county and the average surface per local county.7 As it is apparent,
the number of local counties per canton, also referred to as fragmentation, is associated
with population size. A simple correlation between population size in a canton and the
number of local counties is 0.69, so more populous cantons have more local counties.
Despite this high correlation between population size and the number of counties there
is still a large variation in the degree of administrative decentralization, as measured by
the average population per local county in a canton. As the number of counties per region
does not vary over time we control for this aspect of administrative decentralization by
xed e¤ects.
Our focus is on school education. In Switzerland, there is a primary school level, a
lower secondary school level, and, nally, an upper secondary school level. The rst two
school levels comprise the nine years of compulsory education8. The third level, with a
duration of four to ve years, o¤ers the university entry qualication, called the Maturité,
to students who successfully completed this school and past the nal exams.9 This last
level of education will be used as a proxy for educational attainment.
Many responsibilities are common across all cantons in the way they are shared be-
tween the local and the central government. Common features among all cantons are that
the primary school is the exclusive responsibility of the local communities and many as-
pects of the upper secondary school is under the jurisdiction of the cantonal government.
School material and the denition of aims, scope, and structure of school at all three
levels are regulated by cantonal, i.e. central, law. Organizational issues concerning the
day-to-day running of the schools like the allocation of pupils to classes, the enforcement
of discipline at the school, and ensuring that pupils attend class are the responsibility
7The average surface is based on the total polygonal surface for each canton minus the non-productive
surfaces, i.e. lakes, glaciers, rocks, etc.
8Many cantons however give pupils the option to stay on for one more year after the ninth year without
giving an additional qualication.
9There also exist professional schools that qualify students for eld-specic tertiary education. We
return to those type of schools in the section assessing adverse e¤ects of decentralization.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by Canton
Canton Mean Standard Deviation
232 539 2325 5.91 0.37 0.024
20 54 2688 11.98 0.78 0.014
6 15 2488 26.35 0.73 0.040
3 190 63338 11.79 0.01 0.010
86 258 2996 5.98 0.63 0.030
Bern 400 942 2356 12.02 0.48 0.025
242 233 965 6.30 0.50 0.030
45 402 8938 5.37 0.15 0.014
29 39 1334 14.95 0.68 0.031
212 186 878 19.55 0.76 0.032
83 69 831 10.02 0.45 0.022
107 345 3224 13.01 0.71 0.035
62 166 2672 11.46 0.66 0.012
11 38 3416 18.97 0.89 0.031
7 32 4586 56.99 0.93 0.012
34 74 2165 8.67 0.66 0.020
30 128 4250 24.22 0.79 0.016
126 243 1931 6.22 0.75 0.017
90 447 4963 19.63 0.81 0.024
245 308 1257 7.84 0.44 0.038
80 227 2832 10.64 0.77 0.030
Uri 20 36 1776 23.88 0.67 0.023
384 615 1601 6.99 0.45 0.013
160 275 1719 15.07 0.40 0.018
11 97 8834 18.38 0.74 0.021
Zürich 171 1196 6996 9.53 0.64 0.045
Switzerland 2896 7185 2481 14.26 0.215
Number of local 
counties
Population in 
1000s
Average 
population per 
local county
Average surface 
(km2 per county)1
Average education expenditure 
decentralization over time 2
Aargau
Appenzell-Ausserrhoden
Appenzell-Innerrhoden
Basel-Stadt 
Basel-Landschaft
Fribourg
Genève
Glarus
Graubünden
Jura
Luzern
Neuchâtel
Nidwald
Obwald
Schaffhausen
Schwytz
Solothurn
St. Gallen
Ticino
Thurgau
Vaud
Valais
Zug
0.55 3
Notes: Decentralization is defined as the ratio between the sum of all local expenditure in a canton and the sum of all local plus cantonal expenditures. 1Based on total surface per canton minus non-
producutive surface (lakes, rock, glaciers). The population data is based on an average between 1997 and 2001.  2Calculated for average education exependiture between 1981 and 1999. 3Average 
decentralization rate for 1982 to 1999 defined as the sum of all local expenditures across cantons on public education as a share of all expenditure by local and cantonal governments across cantons. 
The unweighted average across cantons is 0.61.
of the local counties. As in most OECD countries pupils are guaranteed a place in a
school within the catchment areaof residence.10 Furthermore pupils can only attend
schools of another area under exceptional circumstances. Education is free for residents
of a canton but school fees can be levied for pupils residing outside the canton; 95% of
pupils in Switzerland attend public schools.
So as such pupils and parents only have a choice of school via the choice of residence.
However unlike the US and the UK where the relative performance of schools across
and within areas is well documented and made public, no generalized information of this
kind exists in Switzerland. Even if parents get informed through casual observations and
experience, no objective evaluation is available which suggests that school quality is not of
rst order importance in residential choice. We return to this point in more detail below.
Inspections and auditing of schools is present in all cantonal legislation and is made
operational through external inspectors appointed by the central cantonal government.11
They are in charge of training and evaluation of teachers, the supervision of school man-
agement, the observation of school curricula, and the use of teaching material, and the
inspection of school locations.
2.2. Decentralization in Education Expenditures
As noted above, in Switzerland, responsibility for school-level education divided between
the cantons and the local counties, with the federal government playing no role. Thus, a
natural measure of decentralization is the degree at which local counties are in charge of
public expenditure. We use data from the Swiss Federal Statistical O¢ ce. Our measure
of expenditure decentralization in year t and in canton c; Dct is
Dct =
LEct
LEct + CEct
(2.1)
where LEct is the sum of education expenditures in all counties in canton c in year t,
and CEct is he sum of education expenditures at the cantonal level in year t: When all
10See for instance in Appenzell-Ausserrhoden art. 20 Schulgesetz, par 1. (Also in art 20.3 states that
when pupils from another local county attend school than nancial support can be requested from that
county to help in the nancing of those pupils; in Bern art. 7, Volksschulverordnung (VSV) 432.211; in
Freiburg art. 8, Schulgesetz and also "Gesetz über den Mittelschulunterricht"; in Nidwald art. 11 Volkss-
chulgesetz (312.1); in St. Gallen art.s 52 and 53 Volksschulgesetz;in Solothurn art. 45, Volksschulgesetz,
or in Schwytz art. 32 Verordnung über die Volksschulen.
11For instance see the legislations of the cantons of Thurgau (art 5, 410.1 Unterrichtsgesetz, www.tg.ch),
Valais (Titre 2, Chapitre 1, 400.1 Loi sur linstruction publique, www.vs.ch), or Zug (art 67, 411.11
Schulgesetz, www.zg.ch)
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expenditures are carried out on the local level Dct = 1; and when the cantonal government
is solely in charge of expenditure then Dct = 0:12
For the education sector we see in Table 1 that the average level ofDct in Switzerland is
0.55, that is about half of all expenditure on primary and secondary education in a canton
is spent by the local counties. Whereas Basel-City is a very centralized canton along this
measure, Obwald is almost entirely decentralized. The last column in Table 1 gives
the standard deviation of education decentralization for each canton which reects the
variation in decentralization within a canton over time. Two facts can thus be highlighted.
First there is su¢ cient time variation ofDct within each canton for meaningful xed e¤ects
regressions. Second, there is no general discernible time trend in decentralization.
A key question, of course, is what Dct is really measuring. First, in the empirical
literature on scal decentralization, there is always a concern that scal indicators may not
measure the true autonomy of sub-central government over educational policy decisions.
(Ebel and Yimaz(2002)). In the next section, we address this issue in some detail.
2.3. Decentralization and Autonomy
The purpose of this section is to see how actual legislation on local autonomy is related
to observed decentralization. As the primary school is always under local and the upper
secondary always under central jurisdiction we focus on the delegation of decisions at the
lower secondary school. Specically we identied who is in charge of:
 appointing teachers,
 determining the pay level of teachers,
 teachersincentives
 structural school organization.
In each of these four aspects of education policy, we made a judgement, based on our
reading of legal sources, as to whether the policy was wholly under the control of central
(cantonal) government or local government. Table A2 describes in detail the legal sources,
and the level of government responsible for each of the four decisions, for each of the 26
12An issue that is raised in the literature on federalism is the transfers across states via the federal
government - or in our context between the cantonal governments and the local counties. In Switzerland,
the local counties principally raise their own taxes to cover expenses and the transfers play, in general, a
minor role in adjusting living standards across regions.
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cantons. The sources relate to current legislation as of August 2003. Where possible each
legislations has been traced back to assess if within the sample period there have been
changes to these laws; but no evidence for such changes have been found.
To interpret this table, it is probably helpful to go into more detail on the last three
dimensions of autonomy. The second dimension asks whether pay can be set at the local
level. In most cantons, teachers pay is regulated by the law on civil servants. Each
teacher is allocated a pay grade (or spinal point) depending on qualication, the type
of occupation, and work experience. However in a few cantons the local counties can
make additional payments to attract teachers or can independently design their own pay
systems.
The third dimension of local autonomy concerns the presence of incentive pay set at
the local level. Usually teachers, after being hired, are automatically promoted at the
beginning of each academic year to the next pay grade (or spinal point). However in some
cantons13, this progression can be put to a halt should the performance of teachers be
insu¢ cient. Then teachers can either be kept on the same pay level or even relegated to
a step further down the salary scale.
The fourth dimension concerns local autonomy in terms of school organization. This
does not refer to routine management of schools, but whether local counties can in fact
make important structural decisions of some kind. Here we nd that four cantons can
indeed make such choices. In two cantons the local counties can choose between di¤er-
ent school models to provide a specic level of education (Appenzell-Ausserrhoden and
Zürich). In a further two cantons - Solothurn and Valais - local counties can decide
whether they want to introduce an additional 10th year of education.14 Finally, the can-
ton of Valais entitles the local counties to decide if they want to regroup pupils from
di¤erent school years for reasons of e¤ectiveness.
13This form of autonomy is present in the cantons of Appenzell-Ausserrhoden, Glarus, Nidwalden, Zug
and Zurich and to a certain extent (punishment requested by local authority and granted by cantonal
government) in Basel-Landschaft. In the canton of St. Gallen teachers can be dismissed by the local
counties. Apart from such sticks,some cantons allow the local counties to award its teachers carrots
in the form of performance related pay. This can take on di¤erent forms. In Appenzell-Ausserrhoden,
local governments can spend up to 0.2% of their wage bill on performance related pay. In Schwytz local
councils can budget a specic credit - referred to as Spontanhonorierung (spontaneous reward) - of up to
0.3% of gross total wage pay. If this credit is granted by the local legislative body, school councils can
then reward teachers for their exceptional performance. In Zug, local councils are generally also allowed
to make such bonus payments.
14Except for these two cantons the presence of the 10th year is regulated by cantonal law and local
counties can not choose to introduce when it is not present or opt out of it when it is.
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In Table 2 cantons are ranked in descending order in terms of their level of education
decentralization dened as the sum of local expenditures divided by all education expen-
diture, local and central, in a canton. In columns (3) to (6) we show if a canton allows
for local autonomy in any of the four types of dimension discussed above. This table
reveals an interesting pattern: cantons with high levels of decentralization are more likely
to have broader local autonomy. In particular one can see that cantons with more decen-
tralization have a higher probability to give their local counties autonomy over teachers
incentive pay. A simple cross section regression analysis - not reported - makes this point
more formally where we regress the average level of decentralization per canton over time
on a set of dummy variables equal to one if in a local autonomy is present. Two categories
have statistically signicant explanatory power: autonomy over teacher appointment and
on teacher incentive pay is positively correlated with higher decentralization and over
70% of the variation in decentralization across cantons can be explained by a variation in
autonomy.15
We can thus conclude that autonomy is indeed associated with to expenditure decen-
tralization in this specic context. The question then arises as to why we do not use
the four autonomy measures (or some index based on them) directly in regressions below
explaining the maturité rate. The answer is simply that the autonomy measures are not
time variant and therefore their e¤ects are indistinguishable from canton xed e¤ects. So,
in our regressions below, the e¤ect of scal decentralization on the maturité rate is iden-
tied from the time-series variation in Dct: So, it is important to know that this variation
is not just random noise. We now turn to discuss this issue.
2.4. Sources of Variation in Education Decentralization over Time
In this section, we argue that at least part of the time-series variation in Dct can be
explained by variations in school student numbers over time in a canton, and also that
variation in student numbers is likely to be independent of the maturité rate.
Note rst that the local and cantonal components of school education spending can
be written by denition as:X
l
LElct  LTSct + LOCct; CEct  (1  c)LTSct +HTSct + COCct (2.2)
where LTSct denotes the total teacherssalary bill in primary and lower secondary edu-
15This result is also robust to the introduction of other control variables: cantons that are more
fragmented in the administrative divisions - as measured by the population per local county - do have
higher decentralization.
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Table 2: Sources of Variation in Education Decentralization
(1) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Canton
0.93 1.00 Y x x
0.89 1.00 Y x (x) x
0.81 0.75  0.00118*  N x (x)
0.79 0.80  0.00684** Y x x
0.78 1.00 -0.0296 x x x
0.77 0.75  0.00048 (x) x
0.76 0.63  0.00048 x x
0.75 0.54 -0.000952 x x
0.74 0.50 -0.0141*** Y x x x
0.73 0.80 Y x x
0.71 1.00  0.0005 x (x) x
0.68 0.50  0.0317 x x
Uri 0.67 0.65 -0.0832 x (x) x
0.66 0.55 -0.0192*** Y x (x)
0.66 0.57  0.0230 x
Zürich 0.64 0.67 Y x x x
0.63 0.50 -0.00197*  Y x (x)
0.50 0.65 Y x
Bern 0.48 0.70 Y x
0.45 0.00  0.0451 x
0.45 0.00 -0.00283*** Y x
0.44 0.57 Y x
0.40 0.50 Y x x
0.37 0.25 -0.00115 x
0.15 0.00 -0.00168
0.01 0.00 N (x)
Education 
Decentralization
Local Cost Share 
of Teacher 
Salaries
Marginal effect 
of student 
numbers
In line with 
predictions?
Teacher 
Appointment
Teacher 
Salary
Teacher 
Incentives
School 
Organization
Obwald  0.0313***
Nidwald  0.0325*  
St. Gallen
Schwytz
Appenzell-Ausserrhoden
Thurgau
Graubünden
Solothurn
Zug
Appenzell-Innerrhoden  0.3087***
Luzern
Glarus
Neuchâtel
Schaffhausen
 0.00168***
Basel-Landschaft
Fribourg  0.00377***
 0.0000122***
Jura
Vaud
Ticino  0.0184***
Valais  0.00382** 
Aargau
Genève
Basel-Stadt  0.00957***
Note: Education decentralization is defined as the sum of all local expenditure divided by cantonal expenditure plus the sum of all local expenditure in a canton. Local share of teacher costs refers to the share of teacher 
salaries and compensations that are financed at the local level. The correlation between the degree of decentralization and the cost share is 0.81. Legal sources on cost shares are available upon request.  In column 2b we 
report the marginal effect of changes in student numbers in a canton on the level of decentralization. In 15 out of 26 cantons the effect significant and in 13 cantons the coefficient is of the expected sign.  An 'x' denotes that a 
decision is taken at the local rather than at the central level; (x) decision is shared between local and central government. Teacher Incentives refers to decisions about performance related pay (pay level increment, bonus 
etc.); School Organization refers to decisions about significant organizational matters (class structure, schemes). See Appendix 1 and 2 for definitions and legal sources on autonomy.
cation (lower-school) in canton c at time t; HTS denotes the total teacherssalary bill in
higher secondary education (higher-school) in canton c at time t; and nally LOCct; COCct
denote other education costs incurred at local and cantonal level which may be a function
of the number of students.
These formulae describe several important stylized facts of the Swiss context. First,
in all cantons, the cost of teacherssalaries at the lower level are shared between local
counties and the canton. In particular, the share c varies across cantons but is xed
over time during our sample period16: it is given for all cantons in column (2a) of Table
2. Note that there is quite a lot of cross-section variation in c: for example, in the
canton Obwald the full cost of teacher salaries is nanced at the local level, whereas in
Zürich 67% of the cost is borne by the local counties and nally in Geneva all costs are
covered by the central government. Second, the cost of cost of teacherssalaries at the
higher secondary level is paid entirely by cantonal government. Third, all other costs are
shared between local and cantonal government. We do not have details on the sharing of
other costs, but we do know that other costs in the aggregate are relatively unimportant
compared to teacherssalaries - the latter comprise 50-70% of spending in the aggregate
(Plotke, 1979, 2003)
Note that (2.1) and (2.2) must explain fully the variation over time in the decentral-
ization indicator, in particular,
Dct  cLTSct + LOCct
LTSct +HTSct + LOCct + COCct
(2.3)
This shows that mathematically, variation over time in the indicator must come from
either (i) uctuation in lower-school teacher salaries LTSct; (ii) uctuation in local and
central other costs, and (iii) cantonal expenditure on higher-school teacher salaries and
other costs which may be related to the number of students.
Moreover, as the cost of lower-school teacher salaries is shared between the central
and the local governments in a xed ratio, a change in the number of teachers in a canton
generically induces a change in the degree of decentralization. Indeed when the local cost
share c in a canton is higher (lower) than the degree of decentralization,  > Dct; then
more teachers leads to a subsequent increase (decrease) in the level of decentralization17.
16These local shares do not vary over time for the sample period. Legal sources for this data are
available from the authors.
17For example in the canton of Fribourg where on average the degree of decentralization is 0.50 and
the local cost share is 0.65 an increase in the number of teachers leads on average to an increase in
decentralization whereas in Zug, where decentralization is at 0.74 and the local cost share is 0.50, more
teachers leads to lower decentralization.
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Mathematically, from (2.3):
@Dct
@LTSct
=
  Dct
LTSct +HTSct + LOCct + COCct
Thus the foremost source of year-to-year variation of decentralization in a canton is in-
duced by changes in the number of teaching personnel and their compensations.
Second, all cantons regulate the class sizes for all school levels by imposing minimum
and maximum class sizes.18 When a class in a school goes above or below these thresholds
readjustments are made either by relocating students to other classes within the same
school or across nearby schools. So, ultimately changes in student numbers in a canton
will lead to straightforwardly changes in teacher salary costs (though cantons have the
discretion to adjust to changes in student numbers19 by hiring more part-time teachers
or not renewing their contracts, or hiring new full-time permanent teachers). Thus, in
principle, an important source of variation in the variable LTSct over time is variation in
the size of the student population in canton c over time.
This shows up in our data. We can also establish empirically that there is a positive
relationship between student numbers and the level of decentralization in those cantons
where the local cost shares in teacher salaries is higher than the level of decentralization.
As the level of expenditures on education other than salaries varies across cantons the
e¤ect of changes in student numbers on the level of decentralization will vary, too. Fur-
thermore changes in student numbers may entail other expenditures that are nanced by
the local or the cantonal governments depending on each canton. As we do not disaggre-
gated data decompose expenditure types within the education category we follow a more
general approach by estimating;
Dct =
P
c cFc +
P
c c (Fc  Sct) + ct (2.4)
where Fc are canton dummies which model xed e¤ects in the level of decentralization
and Sct are the student numbers in a canton and year which is interacted with the canton
xed e¤ects Fc: As no intercept is present in this model, the c measure the e¤ect of
changes in the number of students separately for each canton. The prediction is that the
coe¢ cient c is positive (negative) when the local cost shares are higher (lower) than the
level of decentralization. We estimated this model and report the c coe¢ cients in column
(2b) of Table 2.
18For reasons of space the legal sources have been omitted but are available upon request.
19It can be argued that schools have di¤erential incentives to exhaust the possibilities of adjusting
classes through relocating students rather than by hiring more teachers if they have to face more of the
nancial burden themselves when the cost shares are high. We return to this point in section 4.6.
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As can be seen the coe¢ cient has the predicted sign in 13 cantons, in 11 cantons the
coe¢ cient is insignicant and but in 2 cantons is the coe¢ cient of the opposite sign than
predicted. Thus we nd broad empirical support that changes in student numbers induce
changes in the level of decentralization.
The question then arises as to whether over time, changes in student numbers in a can-
ton over have any additional power in explaining the maturité rate, over and above their
e¤ect on Dct: This is investigated in the next section, where we study the determinants of
the maturité rate. Column 7 of Table 3 below shows that for our preferred specication,
which obviously includes the variable Dct; student numbers has no signicant e¤ect on the
maturité rate. This insignicance seems to be quite robust across a number of di¤erent
specications (details on request).
This nding is also consistent with the fact that in Switzerland - in contrast to the
U.K. or the U.S.A. - there is no school level or even canton level ranking of schools that
are made available to students, parents, or teachers which would allow them to update
over time their information about school quality. Thus parents, for instance, do not have
yearly updates on school performance on which they can base their decision where to
move to enrol their children20. So, we would not expect student numbers to vary directly
with the maturité rate.
3. Decentralization and Educational Attainment
3.1. Empirical Strategy and Data
We now turn to an econometric estimation of the relationship between decentralization
and e¢ ciency of public good provision in the educational sector. We will approach the
estimation with a panel data set of 26 Swiss Cantons over the period 1982-2000. We have
for each canton yearly observations on scal decentralizationDct, a measure of educational
output, the maturité rate Ect; and various input measures. All these variables are dened
in Table A1 and are discussed in more detail below.
We estimate the e¤ect of decentralization in canton c in year t; on the educational
attainment Ect with
Ect = c + t + D
t 1;t k
ct + X
t 1;t k
ct + uct: (3.1)
20There may well be time-invariant di¤erences across schools due to historic di¤erences in the level of
development across cantons which parents are aware of. Yet, these permanent di¤erences are controlled
for by xed-e¤ects.
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All variables are converted into natural logarithms. The variable Dt 1;t kct contains a
measure of the degree of decentralization that a¤ected a cohort in period t in canton c
over the past k periods. This allows to capture the e¤ect a cohort of students experienced
over their whole schooling career. Specically in the regression we will model Dt 1;t kct by
Dt 1;t kct =
Dct 1 + :::+Dct k
k
; (3.2)
i.e. as a moving average of the past k periods.21 The next section will vary k to lter out
the appropriate specication. In particular we will identify separately the e¤ect during
the whole schooling career, i.e. during the past 12 years, and separately from the e¤ect
during the post-compulsory upper-secondary education, i.e. during the past 5 years, and
during the primary and lower secondary education period, i.e. during the rst seven years
of education.
Similarly the vector X t 1;t kct contains moving averages of the past k periods of further
control variables capturing the quality of the human resources, schooling infrastructure,
and per student expenditure. Finally c are canton and t are year xed e¤ects and uct are
unobservable disturbance terms clustered at the cantonal level. The precise specication
of uct will be explained and discussed below.
So, (3.1) can be interpreted as a canton-level production function relating educational
"output" Ect to "inputs" X
t 1;t k
ct and the decentralization indicator (3.2). So a posi-
tive sign for coe¢ cient  indicates that increased scal decentralization leads to greater
"output" for given "inputs" i.e. implies greater productive e¢ ciency.
The main22 output variable Ect is the Maturité rate which is the number of students
who obtain the university entrance level qualication deated by the size of the 19 year
old population. Overall in Switzerland in 2000 17% of the 19 year old population obtained
the Maturité which entitles them to attend university. This level of education is four
to ve years beyond the compulsory level of education in Switzerland. Numerous studies
have shown how students who obtain this level of education have higher future income,
better choice of jobs and subjective well-being.
Turing to choice of input variables, there is a vast literature on the economics of
education that concentrates on the question as to which input measures a¤ect educational
attainment (Hanushek, 1997 and 2003). Our choice of variables is constrained by data
21We also allowed discounting values further in the past which yield similar results.
22However, not all students who continue their education at the upper secondary school level, i.e.
beyond compulsory education, attend schools that provide the Maturité, but rather attend professional
schools that also lasts four to ve years past compulsory schooling. In the next section we will also
address the e¤ect of decentralization on professional school degrees.
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availability but includes such standard variables such as class size and expenditure per
student at primary and secondary school level excluding tertiary education. To capture
the e¤ect of the social composition of the student population we have the proportion of
students whose rst language is di¤erent to the language of instruction: on average 16%
of students are not instructed in their rst language. By this we want to control for the
fact that more foreign students can reduce the educational attainment of a cohort as they
may be more di¢ cult to teach due to the language barrier; in a way we thereby capture
the quality of the input factor.
Of course, many other covariates contribute to the level of educational attainment of
a specic individual student, such as neighborhood characteristics. However the focus
of this paper is to identify the e¤ect of the level of decentralization, which is measured
at the cantonal level, and as such the identication and the bias of that coe¢ cient is not
sensitive to the omission of individual level data (Hoxby (2000)).
3.2. Regression Results
Table 3 turns to a set of panel regressions. In the rst column we report a rst cut at
the data regressing the educational attainment among the 19 year old population in a
year as a function of decentralization during the past 12 years, i.e. the average e¤ect
of exposure to variations in decentralization during the time this cohort spent in school.
This regression is thus in the spirit of cross section regressions that ignore the problem
of omitted variable bias induced by unobserved heterogeneity (Bardhan 2002). There is
a signicant negative correlation between decentralization and educational attainment.
However this can be due to omitted factors that are specic to a region. The importance
of this omitted variable bias is revealed when we add canton and year xed e¤ects in
column (2). Note that now the coe¢ cient is signicantly positive at the 10% level. This
illustrates that it is not innocuous to ignore the potential for unobserved heterogeneity
stemming from historical or cultural di¤erences that are correlated with the degree of
decentralization. This can explain why in some studies using cross-section regressions a
negative correlation has been found.
In column (3) we introduce our set of control variables. Per pupil expenditure, class
size,23 and the share of non-native speakers are not related to educational attainment.
The coe¢ cient on educational expenditure has the expected positive sign just as larger
classes are related to lower educational attainment. When we omit the least signicant
23This refers to total expenditure, local and central, per pupil. Equally, class size refers to cantonal
yearly averages. Note that the e¤ect is estimated only by the variation within a canton over time.
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Table 3 – Decentralization and Educational Attainment in Swiss Cantons
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for clustering at canton level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Decentralization -0.2147*** 0.3767* 0.4085* 0.4123*
average of past 12 years (.0607) (.2185) (.2323) (.2133)
Decentralization 0.3749** 0.3766** .3761**
average of past 5 years (.1740) (.1714) (.1777)
Decentralization 0.0811
average of 6 to 12 years lagged (.1003)
Expenditure per pupil 0.0842 0.0937* 0.0994** 0.1051** .0985**
average of past 12 years (.0537) (.0483) (.0450) (.0434) (.0441)
Class size in upper secondary school -0.0288
average of past 12 years (.0580)
Non-native speakers 0.0105
average of past 12 years (.0236)
Business Cycle 0.0004
(.0006)
Student Numbers -.000023
(.000687)
Canton fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Errors clustered at canton level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.4480 0.9516 0.9539 0.9536 0.9544 0.9544 0.9543
Number of observations 208 208 208 208 208 208 208
Dependent variable = Share of 19 year old population obtaining university entry qualification (Maturité rate)
Base 
regression
Canton & year 
effects
Further 
controls
Further 
controls
Effect over 
time
Business 
Cycle
Student 
Numbers
Notes: * significant at 10% level,  ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level. See Table A1 for definition of variables. Right hand side variables in column (1)-(4) are average values of past 12 
years. In column 5 decentralization is split into average of past 5 years - proxying for the period during upper secondary school - and 6 to 12 years in the past - proxying for the 
period during primary and lower secondary school. In column (6) we measure business cycles as the cyclical part of canton-level GDP per capita using the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) 
filter with  λ=1600. Results in column (4) and (5) are robust to using the raw budget data instead of the smoothed data.
variables, class size and foreign language speakers, we nd that expenditure per student
is signicant at the 10% level. Most notably however is that even after controlling for
this last set of variables we nd that decentralization is positively related to educational
attainment.
So far the right hand side variables are the moving averages of the past 12 years,
i.e. Dt 1;t 12ct and X
t 1;t 12
ct :In column (5) we identify separately the e¤ect of changes
in decentralization during the last 5 years of schooling, i.e. during the post-compulsory
education at the upper secondary school, from the e¤ect of changes during the rst seven
years of schooling;
Ect = c + t + 1D
t 1;t 5
ct + 2D
t 6;t 12
ct + X
t 1;t 12
ct + uct: (3.3)
We nd that it is in fact the changes in decentralization experienced during the last
ve years of education that matter. The coe¢ cient 1 is signicant at the 5% level but
2 is not signicant. The coe¢ cient on expenditure per student remains signicant at the
5% level.
Looking at column (5) of Table 3, our preferred specication, we see that if decen-
tralization increased by ten percentage points it leads to a 4% higher share of 19 year
olds obtaining the Maturité. This e¤ect is quite large given that a one standard deviation
increase in expenditure is only associated with 12% of a standard deviation increase in
educational attainment.24 A further concern are local business cycles which could drive
educational attainment directly thus making our estimates of 1 biased. We thus con-
structed a measure of the local business cycle by taking the cyclical component of per
capita GDP per capita using the using the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) lter. As can be
seen in column (6) of Table 3 the coe¢ cient of decentralization is robust and the coe¢ cient
on our business cycle measure is not signicant.
3.3. Economies of Scale
It has often been argued that one crucial advantage of centralized provision of public
goods is that it can benet from economies of scale in the production process of public
goods: it may be more e¢ cient to focus the design, implementation, and maintenance of
public goods in one place rather than have several jurisdictions simultaneously engage in
the same production process. To assess if this claim holds in our context we proxy for the
scope for economies of scale in two ways.
24Calculated as (0:0994  0:1805)=0:151 = 0:1188
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First we by look at the number of jurisdictions in a canton.25 We thus estimate the
following model:
Ect = c + t + D
t 1;t 5
ct + (D
t 1;t 5
ct  Jc) + X t 1;t 12ct + uct: (3.4)
The variable Jc measures the number of jurisdictions in a canton. Note that even though
the number of jurisdictions is time-invariant, the interaction term is identied by the
time-series variation in Dct. The idea of estimating the interaction term is to capture
scale economies that are not a function of population size but only driven by the number
of administrations in a canton. This is arguably a plausible measure of economies of
scale as an important part of administration takes place at the school level whose size
is determined by local factors and is di¢ cult to vary. The empirical prediction is that
the interaction term is negative, i.e.  < 0: decentralizing is more e¢ cient when there
are fewer jurisdictions involved in the process. Among the Swiss cantons the number
of jurisdictions varies considerable between 3 in Basel-Stadt and 400 in Bern. In Table
4 column (1) we report results using the same sample as in Table 3. We restrict the
specication to those variables that were signicant in Table 4, column (5). As can be
seen the coe¢ cient on the interaction term is negative and signicant at the 5% level.
The coe¢ cient on decentralization 1 now increases to 0:6: This is mainly due to the
presence of the interaction term: the mean number of jurisdictions is 111 in the data set
and therefore the average e¤ect of decentralization is 0:4426. Increasing the number of
jurisdictions by 50 reduces the e¤ect of decentralization on education by 0.1. Thus there
is strong evidence that economies of scale have a strong positive impact in the context of
decentralization.
A second measure of economies of scale is to look at the average population size per
local jurisdiction. This measure captures those aspects of scale economies that are a
function of population size. We nd no evidence, as reported in column (2) of Table 4,
for a di¤erential e¤ect of decentralization when the population per local county changes.
3.4. Local Cost Shares
We now want to explore if di¤erential incentives are induced by variations in the local cost
shares of teacher salaries. One could argue that a highly decentralized canton with a low
25An alternative measure is to use population per jurisdiction which yields qualitatively similar results
to the one presented in Table 6. Similarly the estimated e¤ect is robust to the inclusion of population
size as an additional control variable.
26Calculated as 0:6619  111 0:00199:
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Table 4 – Decentralization, Economies of Scale, Local Autonomy, and Budgetary Competence
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for clustering at canton level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Decentralization 0.6619** 0.3920** 0.6380** 0.6356**
average of past 5 years (.2547) (.1776) (.2655) (.2647)
Decentralization x Number of local jurisdictions -0.00199** -0.0017* -0.0017*
average of past 5 years (.00088) (.0010) (.0010)
Decentralization x Average population per local jurisdiction -0.0163
average of past 5 years (.0304)
Decentralization x Dummy =1 when teacher incentives
decided at local level
average of past 5 years
Decentralization x Smoothed budget surplus at local level 0.0212** 0.0208**
average of past 5 years (0.0097) (0.0097)
Decentralization x Smoothed budget surplus at cantonal level 0.0021 0.0021
average of past 5 years (0.0046) (0.0046)
Expenditure per pupil 0.1080** 0.1097** 0.1040** 0.1061**
average of past 12 years (.0427) (.0427) (.0427) (.0410)
Business Cycle 0.0001
(0.0004)
Canton fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Errors clustered at canton level Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.9554 0.9544 0.9562 0.9562
Number of observations 208 208 208 208
Dependent variable = Share of 19 year old population obtaining university entry qualification (Maturité rate)
Number of 
local 
jurisdictions
Population 
size per 
jurisdiction
Budgetary 
Competence
Business 
Cycle
Notes: * significant at 10% level,  ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level. In column 3 and 4  we first eliminated the cyclical component of the underlying budget surplus data using 
the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filer with λ=1600, where λ is a parameter penalizing variability in the underlying growth component series. Results are robust to alternative 
values of λ. In column (4) we measure business cycles as the cyclical part of canton-level GDP per capita using the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter with  λ=1600. Results in 
column (3) and (4) are robust to using the raw budget data instead of the smoothed data.
cost share may be more willing to make policy changes to improve educational attainment
given that it will only partially have to bear the nancial consequences of their decisions.
Equally, a canton that has a high degree of decentralization but also a high local cost
share may be less willing to implement changes as they will have to cover more of the
nancial cost. To see if there is empirical support for this argument we introduce an
interaction term between the level of decentralization in a canton, Dt 1;t 5ct ; and the local
cost share LCc; 27:
Ect = c + t + D
t 1;t 5
ct + (D
t 1;t 5
ct  LCc) + X t 1;t 12ct + uct: (3.5)
If a high local cost share would indeed inhibit the gains from decentralization then the
the coe¢ cient on interaction term would be negative. As can be seen, however, in column
(3) of Table 4 the coe¢ cient on the interaction term is negative but not signicant and
moreover, when evaluated at the mean level of the interaction term, the coe¢ cient on
decentralization remains the same. Thus the e¤ect of more decentralization is not a¤ected
by how much the local governments have to contribute to the nancing of their policies.
3.5. Decentralization and Budgetary Competence
A further criticism of decentralization is that the competence of local politicians standing
for election may be lower than those standing for positions in the central government. This
may be due to the fact that holding an o¢ ce at the local government is less prestigious
than at the central government. These issues can be particularly acute in the context
of developing countries, as discussed in Bardhan (2002), where the competence of local
public o¢ cials is often low. To assess this second argument we follow the methodology in
Galiani and Schargrodsky (2001). In that paper, competence of a government is proxied
by the size of the budgetary surplus. Low or negative surplus, i.e. decit, is interpreted to
be associated with less competent governments. In contrast to Galiani and Schargrodsky
(2001) we have data not only on the level of budgetary surplus at the central but also at
the local level. To assess the e¤ect of decentralization jointly with the level of competence
we estimate the following model:
Ect = c+t+D
t 1;t 5
ct +L(D
t 1;t 5
ct SLct)+C(Dt 1;t 5ct SCct)+X t 1;t 12ct +uct (3.6)
Here SLct measures the budgetary surplus of all local governments in a canton as a
percent of cantonal GDP; SCct measures the budgetary surplus of the central government
27Recall that the level of local cost share only varies across cantons but is xed across time.
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as a percent of cantonal GDP. Thus L measures the e¤ect of decentralizing towards local
governments with a relatively high level of competence and C measures the e¤ect of
decentralizing away from a central government with a relatively high level of competence.
Note that we continue to control for canton xed e¤ects which holds xed levels of decits
that are determined by the nancing structure in a canton. As there is a strong cyclical
component in the budget data we rst smoothed the underlying budget decit data series
using the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) lter.
In column (3) of Table 4 we report regression results on examining budgetary com-
petence. We see that L is signicantly di¤erent from zero and positive and C is in-
signicant. This is evidence that decentralizing towards a competent local government,
increases the gains from expenditure decentralization. In column (4) we add a measure
of canton level business cycle to address a potential further omitted variable bias. We
measure the business cycle as the cyclical part of the per capita GDP in a canton using
the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) lter. The results also remain the same if do not control
for business cycles directly or in the underlying budget data. Thus there is evidence that
decentralization is more e¤ective when the local government is incompetent. This result
gives support to the notion that competence - even in a developed country like Switzerland
- needs to be taken into account when deciding on the degree of decentralization.
3.6. Adverse E¤ects of Decentralization
So far we have found evidence that decentralization is associated with better educational
attainment as measured by Maturité rates. It is important, however, to test if these gains
were accompanied by losses along other dimensions. We focus on two types of adverse
e¤ects.
3.6.1. Gender
First, we ask is these gains in educational attainment are gender specic, i.e. if the gains
to one gender has been accompanied by losses for the other. There are various reasons
why decentralization leads to more targeted outcomes. If decentralization is increasing
responsiveness to the median voter in each region then the preferences of this voter will
change the policy choice. Central governments on the other hand are argued to be more
able to redistribute gains to minority interests that are less well represented at the local
level. In the case of Switzerland, there are more women than men obtaining the Maturité
as a share of 19 year old female and male population respectively. Table 5 presents panel
regressions where now the dependent variable is the Maturité rate among women in column
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Table 5 – Any Adverse Effects of Decentralization?
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for clustering at canton level
(1) (2) (3)
Decentralization 0.6806 0.8325*** -1.061
average of past 5 years (.4975) (.2911) (1.064)
Decentralization x Number of local jurisdictions -0.0017 -0.0026* 0.0045
average of past 5 years (.1935) (.0015) (.0047)
Decentralization x Budget Surplus at the local level 0.1935 38.874** -43.442
average of past 5 years (12.652) (16.582) (104.28)
Decentralization x Budget Surplus at the cantonal level -1.2598 -8.789 52.53**
average of past 5 years (5.4159) (7.295) (25.084)
Expenditure per pupil 0.1778** -0.0075 -.1248
average of past 12 years (.0656) (.0869) (.3957)
Canton fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Errors clustered at canton level Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.9483 0.9561 0.7313
Number of observations 182 182 208
Dependent 
Variable: 
Maturite rate 
among women
Dependent 
Variable: 
Maturite rate 
among men
Dependent 
Variable: 
Professional 
school degrees
Notes: * significant at 10% level,  ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level. See Table A1 for definition of variables. The dependent variables are: in column (1) the number 
of women obtaining the maturite degree as a share of 19 year old women; in column (2)  the number of men obtaining the maturite degree as a share of 19 
year old men; in column (3) the number of students obtaining the professional school degree as a share of 19 year old population.
(1) and the Maturité rate among men in column (2).28 For the case of female educational
attainment, decentralization has a positive e¤ect but it is not statistically signicant. Only
expenditure is signicantly related to the female Maturité rate. In column (2) we repeat
the same exercise but now for male students only. Here decentralization has a strong
and signicant e¤ect on men; equally the economy of scale a¤ect and the budgetary
competence e¤ect only comes into play for male students but not for female students.
Given that the gains have accrued more to men than to women we also estimated a
gender education gap model - not reported but available on request - where we do indeed
nd some evidence that decentralization reduced the gender gap in education.
3.6.2. Professional degrees
Second, we assess if the gains in terms of Maturité rates has been accompanied by a
decline at other degrees. Among post-compulsory education the modal group of students
attends professional schools rather than Maturité schools. For instance in 2000 17% of 19
year old students obtained the Maturité but 57% obtained a degree from a professional
school. In column (3) of Table 5 we estimate a model where the dependent variable is
the share of 19 year olds that obtain a degree from a professional school. We nd that
decentralization had no e¤ect on that level of education.
In summary, we nd no evidence for adverse e¤ects of decentralization. More local
expenditure is associated with better education among men but that has not been to the
detriment of education among women and we nd evidence that is reduced the gender gap
in education for the Maturité. Similarly other degrees like those obtained from professional
schools are not related to decentralization. Therefore it seems that decentralization is
associated with a net gain in terms of educational attainment.
4. Conclusions
We investigated the empirical evidence on the relationship between decentralization and
the e¢ ciency of public good provision. As a rst step we looked at the current legislation
in the Swiss cantons to provide careful evidence on the positive relation between expen-
diture decentralization and local autonomy in decision, and also describing the sources of
variation in expenditure decentralization over time. We then proceeded to panel regres-
sions of data from Swiss cantons for the last 20 years. We saw that even after controlling
28The sample is somewhat smaller as educational attainment by canton and gender is not available for
the year 2000.
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for other input variables the degree of decentralization is positively related to educational
attainment. We take this to be novel and consistent evidence that contradicts earlier
cross-section ndings that decentralization worsens governance (Treisman, 2002). Indeed
it is the quality of data and the correct specication of the model that helps to uncover
the precise e¤ect of decentralization on the e¢ ciency of public good provision.
We also nd evidence that expenditure decentralization is more benecial when central
governments are less competent. These results shed new light on the empirical relevance
of decentralization and the conditions under which it can attain its often claimed aim of
improving the e¢ ciency of public good provision. Future research should aim to further
rene the institutional details under which decentralization is benecial and to also take
the data to a micro level to see which people benet or lose most and under what conditions
from decentralization.
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Table A1  –  Summary Statistics
The Data covers  26 Swiss Cantons during 1982-2000 
Performance Measure for Public Education Mean St. Dev 
Share of 19 year population with University entry level qualification .164 .057
.165 .074
.161 .046
Professional School Degrees as a share of 19 year old population  .593 .134
Decentralization
Share of local expenditure to all expenditure (local and central)
5 year moving average .610 .215
Number of local jurisdictions in a canton 111.38 111.74
Control Variables 
Education expenditure per pupil* (12 year moving average)
at all levels of government in 1990 1000s of Swiss Francs 14.933 2.926
Class size in schools (12 year moving cantonal average) 32.60 3.29
Non-native speakers (12 year moving average) 16.30 8.13
percent of students whose first language is not the language of instruction
Budget surplus as a percent of cantonal GDP (5 year moving average)
  -at the central (cantonal) government level -.7825 .9249
  -at the local government level -.3655 .3825
Business Cycle
Cyclical component of the canton-level GDP per capita using the -789.44 2104.86
Maturité rate
Female Maturité rate as a share of 19 year old women 
Male Maturité rate as a share of 19 year old men  
 Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter
Notes: All data is from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (various departments); http://www.statistik.admin.ch. *primary and 
secondary education excluding tertiary education.
Table A2: Legal Sources on the local autonomy of schools in Swiss cantons as of 2003
Canton Code legal sources Teacher appointment Teacher Salary Teacher Incentives
AG local central central central
AI local central local central
art 44, 53b, 54; 401.1 401.1
AR local central local: local
art 29, 411.0 art 10, 421.21 art 6, 411.1
Bern BE local central central central
art 7, 430.250 430.25 art 12, 432.210
BL local central partially local central: 
art 49 SGS 642.11 art 24, SGS 640
BS partially local central central central 
art 80,86,94; 410.100 162.100 162.100 art 69; 410.100
Structural School 
Organisation
Aargau http://www.ag.ch/sar/
401.100 Schulgesetz art 42, Schulgesetz art 66 Schulgesetz Schulgesetz
Appenzell-
Innerrhoden
http://www.ai.ch/_d/lexdb/index.shtml
401.100 Schulgesetz art 42, Schulgesetz art 36, Schulgesetz
Appenzell-
Ausserrhoden
www.ar.ch
411.0 Schulgesetz
411.1 Schulverordnung A local authority can spend up to 
0.2% of their wage bill on bonus. 
Teachers can also remain on the 
same pay level or can be 
relegated to a lower pay level in 
case of unsatisfactory work.
(choice within 
Sekundarstufe 1)412.21 Anstellungsverordnung 
Volksschule
http://www.sta.be.ch/belex
432.210 Volkschulgesetz (VSG) except for reprimands: art 21 par. 
i, 432.211432.211 Volksschulverordnung (VSV)
430.250 Gesetz über die Anstellung 
der Lehrkräfte (LAG)
Basel-
Landschaft
http://www.baselland.ch/
SGS 642.11 Schulordnung für die 
Volksschulen und IV-Sonderschulen
Local administration can request 
further disciplinary measures 
going beyond formal reprimands: 
art 104 par 4; SGS 640.
(by Schulpflege)
SGS 640 Bildungsgesetz 
Basel-Stadt http://www.gesetzessammlung.bs.ch
Schulgesetz 410.100
Personalgesetz 162.100 local suggestion but 
decision central in 
particular if suggestion 
split in local authority.
Table A2 (continued)
Canton Code legal sources Teacher appointment Teacher Salary Teacher Incentives
FR local central central central 
art 45; 411.0.1 122.72.21 122.72.1 art 26 to 29; 411.0.1
GE central central central central
C 1 10 art 130, C 1 10 C 1 10
art 122, C 1 10
GL local central: local central
art 64, IV B/1/3 art 74, IV B 1/3 art 67, IV B 1/3 art 12-40; IV B/1/3
GR local: central: local: central: 
art 34; 421.000 art 35; 421.000 art 5; 421.080  421.000
art 14 par 4; 170.400
JU local: central (strict!): central central
art 87; 410.11 art 96; 410.11 art 95; 410.11 410.11
art 30,31; 173.11
Structural School 
Organisation
Fribourg http://www.fr.ch
122.72.1 Gesetz über die 
Besoldungen des Staatspersonals
122.72.21 Beschluss über die 
Einreihung der Funktionen des 
Staatspersonals
411.0.1 Schulgesetz
411.0.11 Schulverordnung
Genève http://www.ge.ch
C 1 10: Loi sur l'instruction publique by the Conseil d'Etat 
Glarus http://www.gl.ch/gesetzessammlung/
IV B/1/3 Bildungsgesetz
(Schulbehörde)
Graubünden www.gr.ch
421.000 (Schulgesetz)
170.400 (Personalverordnung, PV)
421.080 Lehrerbesoldungsverordnung Pay increases on average by one 
step on pay scale per year but 
local authority can, depending on 
performance, award between 
zero and two steps.
Jura www.ju.ch
410.11 Loi scolaire
173.11 Loi sur le statut des 
magistrats, fonctionnaires et 
employés de la République et 
Canton du Jura
Table A2 (continued)
Canton Code legal sources Teacher appointment Teacher Salary Teacher Incentives
LU local: central/part local local central: 
art 47; SRL 400.a art 29; SRL 400.a art 48 GVSB, SRL 400.a
NE local: central part local central
art 32; 410.10 152.510 410.10
art 14; 410.23 152.511
Structural School 
Organisation
Luzern http://www.lu.ch
SRL 400.a: Gesetz über die 
Volksschulbildung (GVSB) art 11; SRL 075 
stipulates that up to 
25% of salary can be 
paid to attract 
teachers with 
exceptional 
qualifications.
art 35; SRL400.a: up to 25% of 
salary can be given as a reward 
for extraordinary performance.
SRL051: Gesetz über das öffentlich-
rechtliche Arbeitsverhältnis 
(Personalgesetz) art 11; SRL075: up to 25% of 
salary increase to keep a teacher 
with exceptional qualification.
SRL075: Besoldungsverordnung für 
die Lehrpersonen und die 
Fachpersonen der schulischen 
Dienste
art 8 par 3; SRL075: if a teacher 
does not fulfill requirments than 
her pay can remain on the same 
level (instead of automatic 
increase to the next level)
Neuchâtel www.ne.ch
RSN 410.10: Loi sur l'organisation 
scolaire
(requires approval from central 
government):  rewards for 
exceptional service art 61; 
152.510 and art 36; 152.511
RSN 410.23: Loi concernant les 
autorités scolaires
RSN 152.510: Loi sur le statut de la 
fonction publique
RSN 152.511: Règlement général 
d'application de la loi sur le statut de 
la fonction publique
Table A2 (continued)
Canton Code legal sources Teacher appointment Teacher Salary Teacher Incentives
NW local partially local local central
art 20; 311.1 art 21; 311.1 art 11 par 2; 311.112, 311.1
OW local: central local: central 
art 68; 410.1 art 23, 141.11 art 6 and 8 par d, 141.111 art 12; 410.1
art 73; 130.1
SG local central part local central
art 114; 213.1 SGS 213.51 213.1
SH local central central central 
art 57; 410.1 art. 9 and 41; 180.100 410.1
Structural School 
Organisation
Nidwald www.nw.ch/regierung_verwaltung/staatskanz
lei/kanzlei/druckzentrale/gesetzessammlung/
band 3/inhalt_3.html
Local counties 
choose payment 
scheme by majority 
rule which has to be 
approved by central 
government. Central 
government can then 
implement scheme in 
all counties if a 
majority of counties 
approve of it.
no increase in pay due to 
insufficient performance311.1 Bildungsgesetz
311.112 Vereinbarung über die 
Entlöhnung der Lehrpersonen der 
Gemeindeschulen 
(Entlöhnungsvereinbarung)
art 7; 312.1 quality audit; in case 
of changes local 
recommendations are to be 
taken into account whenever 
possible312.1 Volksschulgesetz
Obwald www.ow.ch
410.1 Gesetz über Schule und 
Bildung (Schulgesetz) Punishments for insufficient 
performance leading to pay 
remaining on the same pay level 
or relegation to a lower level.  
Performance related pay of up to 
60% above base.
130.1 Staatsverwaltungsgesetz art45ff
141.111 Ausführungsbestimmungen 
über die Stellenbewertung und 
Entlöhnung
141.11 Personalverordnung
St. Gallen www.gallex.ch
SGS 213.1 Volkschulgesetz local for end of contract, art 72; 
213.1. central for stop of salary 
increase art 82, 86; 213.1 
SGS 213.51 Gesetz über die 
Besoldung derVolksschullehrer
Schaffhausen www.sh.ch
SHR 410.1 Schulgesetz art 79; 410.1 and art 
2d; 180.110SHR 180.100 Personalgesetz
SHR 180.110 Besoldungsdekret
Table A2 (continued)
Canton Code legal sources Teacher appointment Teacher Salary Teacher Incentives
SO local central central: local: 
SZ local central local central
art 5; 612.110 612.110 611.210
TG part central: central: local central 
177.250 410.1
TI local central central central
art 2 par b; 2.5.4.1. 2.5.4.1. 5.1.6.1.1 and art 34; 2.5.4.1 5.1.1.1
Uri UR local part local local: central 
art 59; 10.1111 10.1111
Structural School 
Organisation
Solothurn www.so.ch
413.111 Volksschulgesetz (VSG) art 53; 413.111 and art 
5; 413.121.1
art 12; 413.121.1 and 
art ; 126.515.851.1
art 4 par. 2 in 126.515.851.11 art 
4 par 2
art 21, par 2; 413.111: 
local counties can 
introduce an optional 
10th year (nine years 
are compulsory)
413.121.1 Anstellungsverordnung 
Volksschule
126.515.851.1 Lehrerbesoldungsgesetz
Schwytz www.sz.ch
611.210 Verordnung ü.d. Volksschulen art 41; 612.110: school council 
can allocate up to 0.3% of total 
wage bill to bonus payments for 
exceptional performance.
612.110 Personal- und Besoldungs-
verordnung für die Lehrpersonen an 
der Volksschule
Thurgau www.tg.ch
410.1 Unterrichtsgesetz art 54; 410.1 
(nominated locally but 
approved centrally)
up to 5% wage reduction for poor 
performance art 12; 177.22, but 
strictly no additional payments by 
local authorities art 6, (177.250)
177.22 Besoldungsverordnung
177.250 Verordnung des Grossen 
Rates ü.d. Besoldung der Lehrkräfte
Ticino www.ti.ch
5.1.6.1.1: R della scuola media
5.1.1.1: L della scuola 
2.5.4.1 Legge sull' ordinamento degli 
impiegati dello Stato e dei docenti
http://www.ur.ch/rechtsbuch/start.htm
10.1111 Schulgesetz art 55; 10.1111: The 
local authorities 
regulate public 
employment within 
the framwork of 
cantonal law.
a) pay increase is based on 
satisfactory performance: art 40 
par 4; 2.4211. 
2.4211 Personalverordnung
b)  concerning bonus payment 
for excellence in performance art 
41 and 42; 2.4211
Table A2 (continued)
Canton Code legal sources Teacher appointment Teacher Salary Teacher Incentives
VD local central central central
art. 79, 4.2.A RSV 1.6 art 27; RSV 1.6 4.2.A
VS local central central local 
art 75; 400.1 art 98, 400.1 art 50; 400.1
ZG local local local central 
art 61; 412.11 art 65; 412.11
Zürich ZH local central local local
art 7, 412.31 412.311 art 23 and 24; 412.311 art 55; 412.11
Structural School 
Organisation
Vaud www.vd.ch
RSV 4.2.A Loi Scolaire
RSV 1.6. A Loi sur le personnel de 
l'Etat de Vaud (LPers)
Valais www.vs.ch
400.1 Loi sur l'instruction publique
405.3 Loi concernant le traitement 
du personnel enseignant des écoles 
primaires, du cycle d'orientation et 
des écoles secondaires du 
deuxième degré.
a) Pupils of different 
school years can be 
regrouped into one 
class for 
effectiveness. b) 
Local counties can 
introduce an optional 
tenth school year.
Zug www.zg.ch
412.11 Schulgesetz art 6, abs. 9-11; 
412.31 to attract 
teachers, pay can be 
increased by up to 
25%.
art 6 abs 7, 9, 12; 412.31. art 74 
abs 1 lit c 154.21: Bonus for 
exceptional performance and 
valuable proposals.
412.31 Lehrerbesoldungsgesetz
154.21 Personalgesetz
www.zhlex.ch
412.11 Volksschulgesetz
177.1 Personalgesetz Increase in teachers pay based 
on "good" evaluation score.
Local counties can 
choose between two 
school models for 
lower secondary 
school.
412.31 Lehrerpersonalgesetz
412.311 Lehrerpersonalverordnung
